This paper examines the determinants of firm growth in the Swedish energy sector using a sample of 200 energy firms active from 2000 to 2010. The article has two aims. First, we seek to investigate whether there is reason to believe that the Swedish energy market will become more concentrated in the future, dominated by a few firms. That would be the result if, for example, large firms systematically and over time grew faster than the smaller firms in the Swedish market. Second, we investigate whether firm growth can mainly be explained by firm-specific variables, supporting Penrose's [1] suggestion that internal resources are the key determinants of firm growth rates. To this end, quantile regression is used in addition to ordinary least squares regression, to provide a more complete estimation of the growth distribution of firms conditional on different attributes. The results indicate that large firms do not grow faster than other firms in the sector, and that energy firms' internal resources are indeed the key determinants of firm growth in the Swedish energy industry.
Introduction
Firm growth is among the most analyzed fields in economics and its impacts on industry concentration, firm survival, and competition are reasons enough for it to be considered crucial for both researchers and policymakers. Most empirical studies on the determinants of firm growth usually start by testing Gibrat's [2] proposition that firm growth is independent of firm size. For the Swedish energy industry, this question was first investigated by Tang [3] . Her results indicate that, on average, Gibrat's law can be rejected, but that approximately 70% of Swedish energy firms are in a steady state in which their size remains roughly constant over time. However, Tang did not investigate what factors determine firm growth in the Swedish energy sector. Other early studies investigating the determinants of firm growth concentrated mainly on the impact of age on the firm growth rate [4] [5] [6] . Generally, a negative correlation between the firm growth rate and firm age seems to be a robust feature of industrial dynamics.
Other studies of firm-specific determinants of growth focus on inter-firm competition [7] , firm legal status [8, 9] , and firm capital intensity [10] . Meanwhile, industry characteristics that could explain firm growth have also been investigated. In [11] the author reports a positive correlation between the MES and growth of new firms, while in [12] there is evidence that firm growth is positively correlated to the average size of plants in the same industry. Scholars have even attempted to consider the effect of macroeconomic factors on country-specific components of firm growth: some [13, 14] analyze how firm growth varies over the business cycle, while others [15] investigate the existence of long-term trends in the dispersion (i.e. between-firm variation) and volatility (i.e. within-firm variation) of firm growth. Nevertheless, the results of these regressions generally possess very low explanatory power. As noted in [16, p. 169] , "the most elementary 'fact' about corporate growth thrown up by econometric work on both large and small firms is that firm size follows a random walk."
Since the first studies of firm growth, researchers have concentrated on the manufacturing industry or on one or more industries differentiated by the degree of labor and capital intensity [5, [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] . Other examples of such studies in the literature can be found in [23] , where the author analyzed the steel, petroleum, and tire industries; in [24] , where the metallurgical industry was analyzed; in [25] , where the authors analyzed the pharmaceutical industry; and in [26] , where the retail and wholesale trade industries were analyzed. Clearly, the results of the various industry studies conducted since [23] have not been conclusive, indicating that firm growth processes need to be studied on an industry-by-industry basis due to heterogeneity in the firm growth process. In [27] the authors have identified substantial industry heterogeneity, and noted that this needs to be accounted for when empirically analyzing firm growth.
In 1996, the Swedish energy market was deregulated, creating a competitive electricity market in electric power production and retail. Given that the Swedish energy sector is said to be characterized by high capital intensity, scale economies, and high sunk costs, we believe it would be interesting to investigate the determinants of firm growth rates in the deregulated Swedish energy sector. This could also be very important for policymakers. For example, if large energy firms systematically and over time grow faster than smaller firms in the Swedish energy market, this would eventually lead to a highly concentrated energy market in which dominant firms could exercise market power and increase prices beyond competitive levels.
Accordingly, this paper investigates whether large energy firms in the Swedish market systematically grow faster than smaller firms, and whether firm growth in the Swedish energy sector can mainly be explained by firm-specific factors, supporting the suggestion in [1] , that internal resources are the key determinants of firm growth rates. These two questions are investigated using a sample of 200 Swedish limited-liability companies active in the energy industry in the 2000-2010 period. A quantile regression technique providing a more complete estimation of the growth distribution of firms conditional on different attributes is also used in addition to an OLS regression.
This paper contributes to the literature as follows. Firstly, to our knowledge, it is the first investigation on the determinants of firm growth in the Swedish energy sector, a matter that could be of great policy importance. Secondly, we also investigate whether firm growth can mainly be explained by firm-specific variables, supporting Penrose's [1] suggestion that internal resources are the key determinants of firm growth rates. This question has also, to our knowledge, not previously been studied for the Swedish energy sector. Thirdly, we expand on the work in [3] , creating a more comprehensive statistical model of both the determinants of firm growth and whether large energy firms in Sweden are growing more rapidly than their smaller counterparts. The results indicate that large firms do not grow faster than other firms in the sector, and that the energy firms' internal resources are indeed the key determinants of firm growth in the Swedish energy industry.
The Swedish energy market is described next, in Section 2, while Section 3 discusses theories of firm growth. Section 4 presents the empirical analysis: the data and descriptive statistics are discussed, as are the estimation methods used, the variables included in the analysis, and the estimation results. Section 4 also presents an extension of the model focusing on the three dominant firms in the Swedish energy industry. Finally, Section 5 summarizes and presents conclusions.
The Swedish Energy Market
Before 1996, the Swedish energy market was regulated and was characterized by vertically integrated monopolies active in local markets. These local monopolies were active in all parts of the energy market, producing electric power, selling electricity to customers, and running the distribution network. The incumbent retailer was the only firm selling electricity to customers in its own market area [28, pp. 4-6] . The electricity market before deregulation was divided into a high-and low-voltage market. The high-voltage market was a market mainly for large industries and retail distributors of electricity, while the low-voltage market was mainly for households [29] . Customers in the low-voltage market could not change suppliers but were stuck with the local monopoly firm in the area where the customer resided. The vertical integration also meant that retailers mostly bought the electricity they sold to their customers from the vertically integrated local power generator.
Prices were indirectly regulated through the state ownership of Vattenfall and the requirements of its pricing formula. Vattenfall was required to apply a pricing formula that could, as noted in [28] , be seen as marginal cost pricing subject to a rate of return requirement and a budget constraint. The formal objective of Vattenfall's use of this formula was to break even, and the formula also established Vattenfall as the price leader in the Swedish energy market. In 1996, the Swedish energy market was deregulated to create a well-functioning electricity market with competition in electric power production and retail. Distribution remained a local monopoly, but third-party access was introduced. Legal unbundling between electricity production and distribution was also introduced to encourage competition. To spur additional competition in the electric power market, collaboration with Norway in the Nord Pool market was introduced. Finland and Denmark entered Nord Pool in 1998 and 2000, respectively; since then, Nord Pool has continued to grow and today includes collaboration with Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, and the Baltic states.
Although there were energy collaborations between Nordic countries before the establishment of the Nord Pool power exchange, the creation of the new marketplace affected all market participants. Nord Pool provides a formal marketplace in which the price of power is determined, meaning that the participating countries' power generators had to compete with generators throughout the Nord Pool area instead of acting as monopolists in their own local markets. In addition, as the market for electric power expanded, one consequence was that the large energy firms in the individual countries commanded smaller market shares in the shared Nord Pool market. As reported in [28, pp. 6-9] , in 2004, the four largest electric power generators in Sweden together commanded 88% of the Swedish market, while in the Nord Pool area, the four largest electric power generators together commanded only 48% of the total market The larger energy market thus offered improved conditions for the market to function effectively without the abuse of market power. However, as discussed above, this could change if large energy firms systematically grow faster than smaller firms in the Swedish market.
As the Nord Pool market handles a large portion of the electricity in the area, the price set at Nord Pool functions as a reference price for the Nordic energy market. The pricing principle in the Nord Pool spot market is a single-price, doubleauction model in which the price is set hour by hour by the intersection of demand and supply bids, at the marginal cost of the marginal bid, i.e. the bid that clears the market. Given that electricity is a homogenous good that cannot be stored in any economically efficient way, and with low transaction costs when changing producer or retailer in the Swedish market, it is unlikely that any one firm can exercise market power. Under these conditions, this pricing principle is efficient, although it allows efficient firms with low marginal cost of production to earn profits. Previous studies using data from the Nord Pool spot market have found that that the market functions efficiently and that market power does not seem to be systematically exploited by generators [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] However, as stated in [36] , there could be problems related to the cross-ownership of nuclear and hydropower plants, and to long-term investment incentives for generation capacity, but these have not been studied systematically in the same way as has pricing on the Nord Pool market.
Theoretical Background: Insights from the Literature
Contributions from such diverse fields as neoclassical economic theory, behavioral economic theory, stochastic growth theory, and various learning models have all been used to predict and analyze the causes and effects of firm growth. The main implication of the classical model is that firm growth is always limited by the optimum firm size. However, evidence from the 1970s indicates a process of concentration in industries, and that some firms may grow larger than seems optimal in a specific industry. Consequently, a main criticism of this model is that it cannot explain the presence of firms that seem to be larger than the optimum size predicted by theory.
The above criticisms of classical economic theory are addressed by the behavioral approach and its "managerial theory". This theory highlights the importance of knowledge assets and coordination processes in firms and assumes that firms grow due to the internal and endogenous creation and accumulation of specific resources [1, 37] . As mentioned in [38] , these internal resources are not only firm specific, but also in most cases change slowly over time, as they are well embedded in the firm organization.
In our paper, we want to investigate the relevance of this "resource-based theory." If the internal resources embedded in the firm change only slowly over time, differences in the use of idiosyncratic resources between firms will be captured by firm-specific indicator variables included in the empirical specifications. If differences in firm-specific resources are the main source of differences in firm growth, as suggested in [1] , including firm-specific indicator variables in the empirical model should increase the explanatory power of the regression model, and we would also expect firm-specific independent variables to be statistically significant, while most region-and industry-specific independent variables would be statistically insignificant [38] .
Some variables related to the firm can easily be measured, and we have access to direct measures of firm size, age, and financial strength. Examples of other important firm-specific resources, more difficult to measure directly but assumed to be captured by the inclusion of firm-specific indicator variables, are brand names, inhouse technological knowledge, employment of skilled personnel, trade contracts, machinery, and efficient procedures [39] . The basic premise of resource-created firm growth is that competitive advantage lies in the possession of such resources and routines, organizational capabilities, and core competencies. This can then also be seen as explaining the types of firm behavior and levels of profitability and growth based on different organizational capabilities.
Meanwhile, stochastic firm growth theory and models based on learning have been developed simultaneously and parallel to the theories above. Although not the main focus of this paper, these theories also deserve to be discussed briefly. Broadly speaking, stochastic growth models have two main objectives: to detect the existence and persistence of the stochastic factors affecting firm behavior, and to detect the presence of inequality and concentration among firms. Of these models, Gibrat's law [2] is still dominant. Since Gibrat, several studies have sought to empirically investigate the relationship between firm growth and firm size, and this was done for the Swedish energy market in [3] . In addition, the passive Bayesian learning models in [40] suggest that firms enter an industry with different (fixed) efficiency levels. Once established in the industry, firms learn about their efficiency, especially in their first years, the least efficient ones being forced to exit, while more efficient firms expand. a To sum up, for the purpose of this paper, we define the main determinants of firm growth as external region-and industry-specific factors affecting the firm, and a group of firm-specific capabilities, some of which change only slowly, or not at all, over time. The firm is considered a collection of productive resources, the allocation of which between different uses is determined by administrative decisions determining firm growth after controlling for all external factors also affecting growth [1] .
Empirical analysis

Estimation method
In line with [38] , we model firm growth as a function of several firm-specific, industry-specific, and municipality-specific factors. The estimated model can be a Jovanovic's [40] written:
where the dependent variable is the log difference of sales, X it−1 is assumed to influence the growth rate of i, and Θ i , γ j and δ m are the corresponding parameter vectors. To control for heterogeneity across firms and time, a F and a t are also included in the model. b Note that to avoid a potential endogeneity problem, all firm-and industry-specific variables used in the estimations are lagged one year, while the municipality-specific variables are treated as exogenous to the individual firm.
Two estimation techniques are used in the analysis: OLS regression and a QR technique. Statistical literature states a number of advantages of using the QR estimator instead of the standard least square regression model. The QR technique is becoming increasingly popular in the context of firm growth research [38, 43] . First, QR allows us to take account of possible heterogeneity across firm growth rates that is not captured by industry-level covariates. Second, a potential shortcoming of OLS in this context is its sensitivity to deviations in the error term from the normality assumption. Previous studies of firm growth rates have demonstrated that growth rates often follow a distribution that is more fat-tailed than normal, and we expect this to be the case for our data as well. Finally, based on the results in [3] , we suspect that the average energy firm does not grow or grows just modestly; accordingly, it would be relatively less interesting to analyze the impact of explanatory variables (i.e., firm-specific, industry-specific, and municipality-specific characteristics) on the average level of firm growth. It would be more informative to analyze not only averages, but also how the explanatory variables affect the group of firms with either very high or very low growth compared with that of the average firm.
The estimated parameters from a QR are interpreted in the same manner as those from an OLS regression. However, the method used to estimate the parameters are quite different as OLS regression minimizes the squared errors, while QR instead minimizes a loss function [44, ch. 7] .
Data
To investigate the determinants of firm growth in the Swedish energy sector, we use a firm-level database on Swedish limited-liability firms. In Sweden, all registered limited-liability firms are legally obliged to submit their annual financial reports to the Swedish Patent and Registration Office and the final data are then collected by Market Manager Partner.
c The data contain all variables found in annual financial reports, such as number of employees and measures of costs and profits. In addition, the year of start-up, five-digit NACE code sector, and geographical location of the firm are contained in the data. For this research, we have access to data from 1116 firms' active in the energy sector (i.e. having the NACE-2007 code of 35100) in Sweden in the 2000-2010 period. As most firms in our study are national or even regional firms with the majority of their sales in the home municipality, with the large multinationals in the Swedish market as the exception, our study focus solely on sales in the Swedish market. The geographical market delineation in this paper is thus the country of Sweden. However, because we want to control for firm-specific heterogeneity using a QR model with firm-specific indicator variables -a computationally intensive estimation technique using bootstrapping to compute standard errors -we need to work with a random sample rather than the whole population of electricity firms. Therefore, a random sample of 200 electricity firms active in the 2000-2010 period was drawn and used for the analysis. The random sample represents approximately 15% of all energy firms in Sweden, and results in an unbalanced panel consisting of 1245 firm-years.
Variables and descriptive statistics
Following [38] , we define firm growth in period t for i as the log difference in sales:
Using sales as a proxy for output growth is common in the firm growth literature, since firm level quantity data are rarely available. However, for sales to be a good proxy for quantity growth, the market under study has to be competitive with low markups over marginal cost. Several studies [30, 31, 34] have investigated the competitiveness of the Nord Pool spot market, and they all report finding low markups over marginal cost at the Nord Pool level. We have not been able to find any academic studies on the competitiveness and markups in the Swedish retail market for energy. However, an investigation by the Swedish energy market inspectorate in 2010 found that at that time the retail margin was between 0.05 and 0.08 SEK/Kwh in the Swedish market. Thus, markups seem to be rather small in the retail market as well, and using sales to measure growth seems to be a reasonable approximation in this setting. The first set of explanatory variables in Equation (1) captures important characteristics of the firm, X it−1 . We include firm size, age, and financial strength as firm-specific factors. Firm size is measured by number of employees in period t − 1. Firm age is calculated as the difference between the firm's start-up year and its most recent active year, measuring the experience of the firm in the energy market. Finally, to capture the financial strength of the firm, we use the ratio of the firm's own capital to its total debt.
Considering that firm growth might also be influenced by factors characterizing the industrial sector as a whole, we also take into account industry-specific factors, Y jt−1 , such as the industry size, minimum efficient scale, number of firms, and market concentration. Such industry-specific characteristics are usually measured at the geographical level assumed to constitute the relevant market. Municipalities were used in [38] to study the Swedish wholesale and retail industries. However, since the deregulation of the Swedish electricity market in 1996, the market has clearly differed from wholesaling and retailing in that customers can choose any Swedish energy retailer regardless of where in the country the retailer is located. Accordingly, we choose to measure the industry-specific variables at the national level, treating Sweden as one market.
Industry size is measured as the total turnover of the Swedish energy industry in period t − 1. Another variable used to control for industry size is the number of firms in the industry at time t − 1. The MES has received considerable attention in recent research; it has been argued that firms in an industry with a larger MES need to grow faster to be competitive with incumbents [45] . Several methods are used to measure MES, using both employment and sales data. In our calculations, follows [38] and [46] , we measure MES as the average firm size in the Swedish energy industry at time t− 1. Finally, market concentration is measured using a Herfindahl index, which is the sum of the squared market shares of all firms in the industry at time t − 1. If the market is supplied by one firm only, the value of the Herfindahl index equals one; if all firms in a market have equal sales, then the Herfindahl index is 1/number of firms.
Another group of factors that may influence firm growth, but that are considered exogenous to the firm, are the characteristics of the municipality where the firm is located. Municipality-specific variables are included to capture local factors that could affect firm growth, such as skilled labor availability and the political preferences of the municipality. This last variable could affect growth through, for example, policy decisions, local rules and regulations, and taxation policy. We accordingly include municipality-specific variables, M mt , such as population size, presence of a university or university college, population educational level, and the political preferences of the local government in our empirical model. Population size is measured as the number of inhabitants in municipality m at time t; the availability of higher education is represented by an indicator variable with a value of one if a university or other institution of higher education is located in municipality m, and zero otherwise. Education level refers to the share of the population aged 16+ years in municipality m that has at least enrolled in a university education. Political preference is measured by an indicator variable assigned a value of one when non-socialist parties possess a majority in the local government, and zero otherwise. This variable is included due to the fairly strong role of local governments in Sweden, where they may affect the growth paths of firms through policy.
As mentioned above, the computational intensity of the estimation process forced us to use a random sample for the empirical estimation of Equation (1). Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for all variables referred to above for the 200 energy-sector firms randomly selected from the entire dataset of 1116 firms active in the energy sector for at least one year in the 2000-2010 period, and for the dataset as a whole. The firm-specific and municipality-specific variables presented in Table 1 are related to the 200 sampled firms, while the industry-specific variables describe the entire dataset. Also, a correlation matrix for the independent variables used in the estimations can be found in the Appendix.
The mean firm growth in the sample is roughly 0.02% annually, slightly below the mean firm growth in the entire dataset. However, the high standard deviation implies a large spread of firm growth around this mean in both the sample and the entire dataset, and that the differences are not statistically significant. Two other firm-specific variables, firm age and firm size, are slightly higher in the sample than in the entire dataset, although their high standard deviations imply that these differences are not statistically significant either. It therefore seems that our random sample is representative of the population of firms under study.
Two of the mean values in Table 1 warrant further comment. Although a total of 1116 firms were active at some time during the studied period, the average number of firms in the Swedish market during this period is 615. This indicates considerable volatility, and that several firms left the market or merged with other firms during this period. Of the 1116 firms, 270 firms were active for the whole study period, while 320 firms were active for three years or fewer. This is also reflected in our sample, were we have an unbalanced panel data set consisting of 1245 firm-year observations, from 200 firms. This means that, on average, each firm is in the sample for approximately 6 years. In addition, the average population of the municipalities where the firms were located was 133,830, indicating that most firms were located in large cities and not in rural areas in Sweden. Table 2 presents the results of an OLS estimation of Equation (1) for both a model excluding firm-specific indicator variables (Model I) and a model including firmspecific indicator variables (Model II). Model I explains very little of the variation in the firm growth rate and, in addition, only two of the estimated coefficients are statistically significant -firm age and local government in the municipality. However, the R 2 values increase from 3% to 23% when firm-specific indicator variables are included in the model, and a likelihood ratio test also show that the preferred model is the one including these variables (Chi 2 = 159.62, p-value 0.000). This is a first indication that firm growth rates may be driven primarily by firm-specific factors, as suggested in [1] . Firm size has a small but statistically significant negative impact on firm growth in Model II. If the number of employees increase by one person, this reduces growth by 0.000569 percentage points. Thus, if a firm has 18 additional employees compared to another firm, we would expect the larger firm to have a one percentage point lower growth, ceteris paribus. That smaller firms on average grow faster than do larger firms in the Swedish energy sector has previously been reported in [3] . This indicates that, in the Swedish energy market, firm growth seems to be negatively correlated to firm size, so there is no apparent risk of large energy firms becoming more dominant in the future.
Estimation results
The firm growth rate is negatively related to firm age in both models I and II, a result indicating possible learning effects for young firms, as suggested via the learning model in [40] . In our estimations, ceteris paribus increasing firm age by one year reduces firm growth by 1.2%. This result also supports previous observations [4, 5] of a negative correlation between firm age and firm growth. In addition, there seems to be a negative correlation between the share of own capital and firm growth, although this result is only significant at the 10% level. This could indicate that Swedish firms would have difficulty financing investments using their own capital rather than external capital. Finally, note that none of the industry-or region-specific variables included in the regression is significant when also including firm-specific indicator variables in the estimations. Similar results, with most (but not all) industry-or region-specific variables determined to be insignificant, were presented in [38] when studying the Swedish wholesale and retail industries.
While the results of the OLS regressions presented above describe the central tendency of the data, QR results may more precisely describe the determinants of firm growth as they investigate the determinants not only at the mean of the data but in different parts of the growth distribution. The QR estimates, including firm-specific indicator variables, are reported in Table 3 .
We find that firm growth is negatively correlated to firm size, but only in the 90% quantile. This strengthens our previous result from the OLS regression model that, in the Swedish energy market, firm growth is negatively correlated to firm size. Again, we conclude that there does not seem to be any risk that the large energy firms will become more dominant in the Swedish energy market in the future. Another interesting finding is that R 2 values are higher in the lowest and highest quantiles (approximately 45%) than in the other quantiles, in which the R 2 lies between 12% and 24%. This indicates that our empirical model captures more of the factors affecting firm growth at the upper and lower ends of the distribution than at the mean. In addition, compared with QR models excluding the firmspecific indicator variables, the increase in R 2 is larger for the lowest and highest quantiles than for the median. This indicates that Penrose's [1] firm-specific growth determinants are more important for fast-growing and fast-declining energy firms than for the average firm in the sector. Finally, the QR estimations provide clear Note: D = dummy variable. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. t-values are reported in parentheses; t-statistics are computed using bootstrapped standard errors with 20 replications.
evidence that industry-specific variables such as industry size, number of firms, MES, and market concentration affect firm growth, but only at the lower end of the distribution (i.e., the 10% and 25% quantiles). The size of the effects for the 10% quantile are as follows. Increasing the industry size by 1 billion SEK reduces firm growth with 2.27 percentage points, while one additional firm increases growth by 0.5 percentage points. Increasing the MES by one million SEK increases growth by 1.6 percentage points, and finally, an increase in market concentration by one percent reduces growth by 0.65 percentage points.
An extension of the model
A main purpose of this paper is to investigate whether large energy firms on average grow faster than their smaller counterparts. In the previous section, we investigated whether large energy firms grow faster than do smaller ones in general, and found that this is not the case. However, our original random sample did not contain data for the three dominant firms in the Swedish energy market, Vattenfall, Fortum, and E.ON. To investigate whether including them in the analysis could change our main results, data for these three firms were added to our sample. The vector of firm-specific factors, X it−1 , now also includes an indicator variable with a value of one for these three large firms, and zero otherwise. We can now also determine whether these three large firms are systematically growing faster than is the average firm in our sample. The results of the OLS estimation of the model, including the firm-specific indicator variables, are presented in Table 4 . First, note that the results presented in Table 4 are very similar to those for the random sample excluding the three large firms presented in Table 2 , Model II, above. The estimated model therefore seems robust to the changes in both data and specifications. Firm growth is again determined mainly by firm-specific factors, with all industry-and region-specific variables being insignificant in the estimations. The large three firms in the energy sector are growing one half percentage points slower than the average firm in our sample, and again there is a small negative correlation between firm size in the previous period and firm growth. As such, we find no evidence that large firms are growing faster than are smaller firms, or that the three large firms in the Swedish market are likely to become even more dominant in the future. It should also be noted that older firms grow more slowly than do younger firms, and that firms that use more own capital also grow more slowly than does the average firm. This could be because Swedish tax regulations somewhat favor external capital rather than own capital. Turning to the QR estimations presented in Table 5 below, the results are again quite similar to those presented above, both regarding size and statistical significance. There is a negative correlation between the indicator variable for firm-years belonging among the three large firms in the Swedish energy market and firm growth in the 75% and 90% quantiles. In addition, there are again negative correlations between firm size and firm growth in the 90% quantile and between firm age and firm growth in the 10% quantile. Evidence again indicates that industry-specific variables such as industry size, number of firms, MES, and market concentration affect firm growth, but again only in the lower end of the distribution (i.e., the 10% and 25% quantiles).
To summarize the results of our extension of the sample and model used, we find no clear evidence that large firms in general, or the three largest firms in the market in particular, are growing faster than are their smaller counterparts.
Conclusions
This paper had two aims. First, we sought to investigate whether there was reason to believe that the Swedish energy market would be more concentrated in the future, becoming dominated by a few firms. That would be the result if large Swedish energy firms systematically and over time grew faster than smaller firms. If so, there would also be reason for policymakers to monitor and perhaps even reregulate parts of the market to prevent market power abuse by dominant energy firms. However, after the deregulation of the Nordic energy market and the creation and expansion of Nord Pool, the large energy firms that were dominant in their individual countries saw their overall market shares decrease within the larger common market. As mentioned above, in 2004, the four largest electric power generators in Sweden commanded 88% of the Swedish market but only 48% of the total Nord Pool market. The larger energy market improved the conditions for the market to function effectively without the abuse of market power.
The second purpose of the paper was to investigate whether firm growth could be mainly explained by firm-specific factors, supporting Penrose's [1] suggestion that internal resources are the key determinants of firm growth rates. Typically, most empirical studies of firm growth have very low explanatory power. This might be because it is fairly difficult to obtain information on many of the internal resources that create value, such as firm-level human capital, firm culture, trade agreements, entrepreneur characteristics, and business models [38] . In the present paper, we try to control for these factors by including firm-specific indicator variables, accounting for the influence of unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity on firm growth. If the inclusion of such indicator variables increases the explanatory power of the regressions, we interpret this as indicating that firm-specific factors are indeed important determinants of firm growth.
The results indicate that the firm-specific variables of which we have direct measures usually have a statistically significant impact on firm growth. In addition, the explanatory power is much higher in both the OLS and QR models including firm-specific indicator variables, indicating that firm-specific factors, such as firmlevel human assets, firm culture, and business models, are important determinants of firm growth in the Swedish energy sector. Another interesting finding is that the R 2 values are higher in the lowest and highest quantiles than in the other quantiles. This indicates that our empirical model captures more of the factors affecting firm growth at the upper and lower ends of the distribution than at the mean.
Two firm-specific variables that have received a great deal of attention in the firm growth literature are firm size and firm age. Most previous studies tend to reject the hypothesis that growth is independent of firm size, instead finding that small firms grow faster than larger ones [47] [48] [49] [50] . That smaller firms on average grow faster than do larger firms has previously also been reported in a study of the Swedish energy sector in [3] . Some studies [4, 5] have also found that younger firms grow faster than older ones.
In this study, we find that if a firm has 18 additional employees compared to another, similar firm, this would decrease growth by one percentage point. Also, increasing firm age by one year reduces firm growth by 1.2 percentage points. We find no evidence that large energy firms, either in general or the three largest firms in particular, were growing faster than their smaller competitors in Sweden during the study period. On the contrary, we found that firm growth was either independent of or negatively correlated to firm size in the Swedish energy industry from 2000 to 2010. Also, the three largest energy firms in Sweden are quite old, and our results show that age is also negatively correlated to firm growth.
Our results show no apparent risk of large energy firms becoming more dominant in the Swedish market in the future. We still, however, suggest that policymakers continue to monitor the market and investigate if there are suspicions of market power being used to set prices above competitive levels. In addition to our results it should also be noted that more countries are joining the Nord Pool market. If transmission capacity between countries in the market is sufficient, this will make it even harder for any one firm to exercise market power in the future.
Finally, we wish to mention one limitation of this study and make a suggestion for future research. Although our results clearly indicate that firm-specific factors are important determinants of firm growth in the Swedish energy sector, our results do not specify what factors in the firm cause this growth. They could be factors such as human assets, firm culture, trade agreements, entrepreneur characteristics, and business models. Many of these factors closely resemble the idiosyncratic resources that Penrose [1] suggested primarily determine the future growth of the firm. We believe that future studies should investigate how firm growth is affected by the firm's internal resources, and that case study research presents itself as a useful complement to our study. Such studies should provide valuable additional insights into how the internal resources of Swedish energy firms affect firm growth rates. 
